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Because of its flexibility and high performance, reconfigurable logic functions
implemented on the Field-programable Port Extender (FPX ) are well suited for im-
plementing network processing such as packet classification, filtering and intrusion
detection functions. This project focuses on two key aspects of the FPX system.
One is providing a Gigabit Ethernet interface by designing logic for a FPGA which
is located on a line card. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets are handled in
hardware and Ethernet frames are processed and transformed into cells suitable for
standard FPX application.
The other effort is to provide a secure channel to enable remote control and
configuration of the FPX system through public internet. A suite of security hard-
ware cores were implemented that include the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES ),
Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES ),Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC ),
Message Digest Version 5 (MD5 ) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1 ). An archi-
tecture and an associated protocol have been developed which provide a secure com-
munication channel between a control console and a hardware-based reconfigurable
network node. This solution is unique in that it does not require a software process
to run on the network stack, so that it has both higher performance and prevents the
node from being hacked using traditional vulnerabilities found in common operating
systems. The mechanism can be applied to the design and implementation of re-
motely managed FPX systems. A hardware module called the Secure Control Packet
Processor (SCPP) has been designed for a FPX based firewall. It utilizes AES or
3DES in Error Propagation Block Chaining (EPBC ) mode to ensure data confiden-
tiality and data integrity. There is also an authenticated engine that uses HMAC
to generate the acknowledgments. The system can protect the FPX system against
attacks that may be sent over the control and configuration channel. Based on this
infrastructure, an enhanced protocol is addressed that provides higher efficiency and
can defend against replay attack. To support that, a control cell encryption module
was designed and tested in the FPX system.
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1Chapter 1
Motivation
As the Internet grows, more and more networking applications will use reconfig-
urable hardware devices to provide both high performance and flexibility. The Field-
programable Port Extender (FPX ) is an open, reconfigurable, high performance and
extensible IP packet processing platform [24][23]. It processes packets in hardware to
perform content filtering, intrusion detection and other customizable functions. All
logic on the FPX is implemented in FPGAs. FPGAs accelerate processing while
preserving flexibility. Several packet processing engines can be deployed in parallel
or in pipelines, and it is possible to achieve multiple gigabit per second throughput.
The FPX platform is highly reconfigurable. New bitfiles can be downloaded on
demand within seconds and start being tested at once. Moreover, the hardware can be
reprogrammed via the Internet without physical access to the device. Consequently,
remote control and configuration of the FPX are feasible and convenient for a network
administrator.
The FPX platform can be deployed throughout a backbone network or at an
access point to an enterprise network. Gigabit rate network links are common to-
day. To meet this bandwidth requirement, the FPX has a broadband line interface.
2To allow the FPX to be easily connected to standard networks, a Gigabit Ethernet
interface was implemented. Ethernet is an evolving technology that will play an im-
portant role not only in Local Area Networks (LANs) but also inWide Area Networks
(WANs).
Secure control and configuration of the FPX system are needed to enable de-
ployment of FPX systems throughout the public Internet. Run time reconfiguration
allows dynamic hardware plugins to be sent over networks and to update the func-
tions on the FPX. It is envisioned that the FPX system will be distributed over large
geographic areas and operate over public networks, making on-site configuration and
management infeasible. The security of the remote control and configuration is a se-
rious concern. Robust security mechanisms are needed to protect the reconfigurable
network nodes from unauthorized access and to ensure the integrity of reconfiguration
when being reprogrammed over the network.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 FPX Platform
The logic of the FPX is implemented within two FPGAs : the Reconfigurable Ap-
plication Device (RAD) which is used to prototype new networking functions and
protocols, and the Network Interface Device (NID) which is used to interface be-
tween the line card and RAD.
The FPX platform can act as a network monitor to screen and analyze the
traffic passing through the Internet. It can also actively process the traffic using
predefined policies. Global Velocity has found one such application for copyright-
protection that detects and blocks peer-to-peer transfer of copyright-protected content
3Internet Side Intranet Side
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Figure 1.1: FPX in a box
on a network. The FPX can also be used to scan and block viruses and Internet
worms.
Two FPX cards and two line cards are used in a FPX standalone platform as
is shown in Figure 1.1. The side on which the control console is attached is defined as
the Intranet side. Notice that it is unnecessary for the control console to be directly
connected to the box. Since the box is Internet addressable, control packets can
be issued remotely. On the Intranet side, the NID on the FPX card is configured
to pass through traffic (NID-PT ). It is responsible for extracting and encapsulating
packets that pass through the network. The other side of the FPX platform is called
the Internet side. On this side, there sits a regular FPX card which monitors or
processes the packets. For historical reasons, the basic unit processed in FPX is an
ATM cell. Internet packets are encapsulated into AAL5 frames. A suite of protocol
wrappers were designed to process data at different protocol layers.
The FPX platform works at gigabit-per-second link speed. The Gigabit Eth-
ernet line card interface allows the FPX to sit in an Ethernet LAN and work in both
4passive and active modes. The line card has a Gigabit Ethernet Controller Applica-
tion Specific Integrated Circuit, the PM3386 S/UNI-2xGE [44]. The PM3386 is a
monolithic ASIC that implements full-duplex 1000 Mbps Ethernet MAC transport
function. The PM3386 provides connectivity to an on-chip SERialize/DESerialize
(SERDES ) and Gigabit Media Independent Interface GMII functions. It also pro-
vides a data transport interface to the up stream device via an industry standard
POS-PHY Level 3 interface. The system’s backplane connector sends and receives
data formatted in ATM cells. In order to translate between ATM cells and Ethernet
MAC frames, an extra circuit is needed. A Xilinx FPGA XC2V1000 [45] is arranged
on the line card to implement those functionalities. The XC2V1000 belongs to the
Xilinx VIRTEX-II family. It has what is called the equivalent of 1M system gates and
also has 160 Kbits of block RAM. These resources are enough to implement packet
processing functions needed for the circuit.
The initial version of the FPX platform did not use any encrypted mechanism
to control and configure the hardware. There is an urgent requirement to add this
functionality in order to make the FPX reliable and secure in a public network.
1.1.2 Gigabit Ethernet Processing
Ethernet has been the dominant LAN technology since the early 1970s. Gigabit
Ethernet is built on top of the Ethernet protocol, but increases speed tenfold over Fast
Ethernet to 1 Gbps. This protocol, which was standardized in June 1998, promises
to be a dominant technology for high-speed local area network backbones and server
connectivity. Reference [39] gives a detailed technology review of Gigabit Ethernet.
Ethernet uses a 48-bit physical address to identify each node. Each frame has
a 14-byte MAC header which includes a 6-byte destination address, a 6-byte source
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Figure 1.2: Ethernet Frame Format
address and 2 bytes payload type field (In Ethernet V2, this field is also defined as
payload length field if the value is greater than 1500). Figure 1.2(a) shows a typical
Ethernet frame as defined in RFC894. IEEE 802.2 also defines a LLC/SNAP field for
the Ethernet header, as shown in Figure 1.2(b). Figure 1.2(c) shows another type of an
Ethernet frame which is defined in IEEE 802.1q known as Virtual LAN (VLAN ) field.
A VLAN can be viewed as a group of devices on different physical LAN segments
which can communicate with each other as if they were all on the same physical LAN
segment. Networks can have differential classes of service (COS ) functions based on
the value of the VLAN ID and the service priority. VLAN technology enables flexible
network segmentation by assigning different VLAN IDs to the different subnetworks.
It improves network management by managing the logical LAN instead of the physical
LAN and increases the performance by isolating the broadcast domains and enforcing
the COS. It also enhances the network security by limiting the extent to which packets
are broadcast.
6In our application, we use Ethernet to carry IP packets. One key protocol
is the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)[35]. Whenever an IP packet is ready to
be forwarded in an Ethernet frame over the network, the directly connected host or
gateway router’s physical address must be resolved using the destination IP address.
To resolve a forwarding IP address to its MAC address, ARP sends out a broadcast
frame called an ARP Request on the shared media. Any host or router which has the
requested IP address or is responsible for that address will send back to the sender an
ARP Reply which contains theMAC address corresponding to the desired forwarding
IP address.
An ARP cache is maintained in order to keep the number of broadcast ARP
Request frames to a minimum. Recently resolved IP addresses and their correspond-
ing MAC addresses are stored in a table. The ARP cache is checked first before
sending an ARP Request frame. Only when there is not a matched entry will an
ARP Request packet be sent. ARP cache entries can either be dynamic (based on
ARP Replies) or static (if configured manually). Static ARP cache entries are used to
prevent ARP Requests from being broadcast for commonly-used local IP addresses,
such as routers and servers. The problem with static ARP entries is that they have
to be manually updated when network interface equipment changes. Dynamic ARP
cache entries have a time-out value associated with them so that entries are removed
form the cache after a specified period of time. The ARP packet format is shown in
Figure 1.3.
1.1.3 Network Security and Cryptography
Although we enjoy the abundant information available on open networks, when we
use the Internet, we also face the threat of being infected with a virus, or having
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our machine hacked. The growth of the Internet requires us to protect both our
infrastructure and information from malicious attacks.
In general, attacks can be classified into two major categories: Denial-of-
Service (DOS ) and Unauthorized Access. For a DoS attack, the attacking host(s)
sends more requests to a target machine than it can handle. Usually the source of the
attack is hard to trace. Unauthorized Access includes eavesdropping, transmission of
fake data, replay of previously sent messages and data destruction. Cryptography
can provide protection against many types of attacks at a reasonable cost. Many
encryption and authentication algorithms have been developed and are widely used
in network security as well as in other fields.
There are two common types of encryption algorithms. The first type uses
private-keys (also called symmetric-keys) which only have one unique key for both
8encryption and decryption; the other type uses public and private key-pairs (also
called asymmetric-keys). Basic attributes of encryption technologies are confusion
and diffusion [41]. Confusion intends to make the relationship between the statistics
of the ciphertext and the value of the encryption key as complex as possible. Diffusion
seeks to make the statistical relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext as
complex as possible. For an ideal algorithm, the security depends only on the secret
key.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES ) [30] was developed by an IBM team
and adopted as a national standard in 1977. Despite the growing concerns about
its vulnerability, DES is still widely used to protect sensitive online applications.
3DES is a variation of this standard that can be billions of times more secure if used
properly. The procedure of 3DES encryption is exactly the same as regular DES,
except that DES is repeated three times. In 2000, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST ) selected the Rijndael algorithm as the proposed Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES ) [31] for protecting data through encryption. In addition
to the increased security that comes with larger key sizes, AES can encrypt data
much faster than 3DES.
Most of the private-key algorithms are perfectly suited for hardware implemen-
tation due to their regular structure and bit-wise operations used to encrypt data.
Many cipher modes can be applied to provide extra security for some kinds of at-
tacks or to protect data integrity. Some classic modes are Electronic Codebook Mode
(ECB), Cipher Block Chain Mode (CBC ), Output Feedback Mode (OFB), Cipher
Feedback Mode (CFB) and Counter Mode (CTR). All of these modes have their own
advantages and disadvantages for different applications. Some novel modes provide
interesting and more secure features [1][32].
9Public-key or asymmetric-key encryption algorithms use two different keys for
encryption and decryption. A key pair is generated and a public key is used to encrypt
messages and the ciphertext can only be decrypted with a private key. For a good
encryption algorithm, it is very difficult to determine the private key given the public
key. This type of algorithms can also be used for digital signatures, authentication
and key distribution. One popular algorithm in this category is the Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA), named after the researchers who developed it [41]. Since asymmetric
algorithms are relatively slow, they are seldom used for encryption of large amounts
of data.
Though encryption itself can provide authentication to some extent, a keyed
hash function is preferred for that function. Algorithms such as Message Digest
Version 5 (MD5 ) or Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1 ) can generate the digest of a
message. Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC ) embeds these hash functions
into what is called a “black box” to have the last digest code only depend on a secret
key [22]. Since it was published in RFC2104, HMAC has become the most popular
method of data authentication.
Firewall technologies and network intrusion detection devices are now widely
deployed in organizations and corporations. They audit and classify packets to de-
tect and prevent harmful attacks. In order to keep up with the explosive growth
of the network bandwidth, encryption and decryption tasks must be performed in
hardware. Reconfiguable hardware is especially well-suited for the implementation of
such network processing functions.
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1.2 Contributions of This Work
The logic that controls a Gigabit Ethernet line card has been implemented on an
FPGA and verified to work with the FPX platform. Another version was designed
for the Multi-Service Router (MSR) project, where the line card is mainly used in
the Washington University Gigabit Switch (WUGS ).
A Secure Control Packet Processor (SCPP) for dynamic configuration of the
FPX has been designed and verified. The module implements several IPSec standards
including AES, 3DES and HMAC using either MD5 or SHA-1. A secure acknowl-
edgement protocol was designed so that the FPX platform can be securely configured
remotely via the Internet.
Based on this infrastructure, the security of the FPX platform was enhanced
by introducing a secure protocol with a secure communication channel between a
control console and an FPX platform. This solution is unique in that it runs in
hardware on the end system, so that it has both higher performance and safety as
compared to protocol stacks implemented in software atop an operating system . This
secure control scheme can also prevent replay attacks.
1.3 Related Work
An Internet Protocol (IP) stack implemented in reconfigurable hardware is used to
process packets [6]. It includes a set of layered wrappers which process ATM cells,
AAL5 frames, and IP and UDP packets. An ARP engine was implemented so that
the system can work in LAN environment. Other projects implemented ARP as
part of IP stack. The protocol stack described in [33] is limited to 10Mb/s Ethernet
11
operation. It implements the lower layers of a protocol stack and only supports IP
and ARP functions.
Symmetric-key encryption algorithms and message digest hash functions are
widely used for network security. Many of them are well-suited for hardware im-
plementation. There are many papers that discuss FPGA implementations of AES,
DES, HMAC and other security algorithms [16][9][14][17]. These kinds of hardware
designs are all tradeoff between the throughput and the circuit area. Usually, iter-
ation unrolling and pipeline technologies are used to improve the throughput. To
optimize the area, iteration rolling is used at the expense of throughput degradation.
For secure remote control, S. Gultchev et. al. presented a secured Reconfig-
urable Management Architecture (RMA) to enforce robust security mechanisms on
mobile Software Radio Terminals [37]. Due to the heavy computation cost, this
scheme is inefficient to implement in a pure hardware environment. The low data
throughput makes it unsuitable for high-speed data communication. R. Chakravorty
et. al. presented a Smart Box Management (SBM ) - an end-to-end remote man-
agement framework for Internet enabled devices [7]. Though this work is focused
on a software framework, it provides a good framework for remote device manage-
ment. While many of the network management technologies today only monitor
nodes, the MIDAS project by S.N.Bhatti et. al. offers management capability for a
large distributed system [4]. Other work done by J. Forne, et. al. presents a solution
providing secure communications over an extended Ethernet LAN [27]. Most of the
works listed above focus on development of a software-based security framework and
involve a huge computational effort, which can cause unbearable overhead and bot-
tleneck performance for applications such as programmable network routers, sensors,
and firewalls.
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1.4 Outline
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the design, verification and
performance evaluation of the logic for a Gigabit Ethernet line card implemented
in an FPGA. ARP processing and packet transformation are discussed in detail.
Chapter 3 discusses the design of some cryptographic modules and their application
in the SCPP structure for secure remote control of a FPX -based firewall, including
a review of the implementation of the AES, 3DES, HMAC and a specific mode,
Error Propagation Block Chaining (EPBC ). In chapter 4, a more secure configuration
protocol is proposed which enables the FPX platform to provide a secure control and
configuration interface for general application. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a
summary and a discussion of future work.
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Chapter 2
Gigabit Ethernet Line Card FPGA
2.1 Protocol Stack
The protocol stack used in the FPX platform is shown in Figure 2.1. On the line side,
IP packets are transmitted over Gigabit Ethernet ; On the system side, IP packets
are formatted into AAL5 frames and split into ATM cells.
The ATM cell has a fixed and short length that makes it suitable for fast
switching and processing functions. One ATM cell has a 5-byte header and a 48-
byte payload. The routing information is indicated by Virtual Path Identifier (VPI )
and Virtual Circuit Identifier (VCI ) fields in ATM header. Header Error Control
(HEC ), the last byte of the header, is used to control the header’s correctness. AAL5
is designed for packet transmission and is widely used to transport Internet Protocol
data. In AAL5, a frame with an arbitrary length is put into a Protocol Data Unit
(PDU ). In this design, we implemented classical IP over ATM. A PDU ’s length is
a multiple of 48 octets. One bit in the Payload Type Identifier (PTI ) field of the
ATM header is used to indicate whether a cell is the last one of a PDU. The last
8 octets of the PDU are used as a trailer, which contain the information about the
14
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Figure 2.1: FPX in a box Protocol Stack
actual length of the payload data and a 32-bit CRC to ensure data integrity. Any gap
between the frame and the trailer is filled with padding. Since PDU s are multiples of
48 octets, the trailer always ends at a cell’s boundary and can therefore be located.
The segmentation of frames with AAL5 and ATM cell’s format are illustrated in
Figure 2.2.
2.2 Architecture
The two major tasks of the Gigabit Ethernet (GigE ) FPGA are to translate proto-
cols and to perform ARP. The hardware logic must act as a bridge between ATM
and Ethernet networks, handle both ARP request and reply, and maintain an ARP
table. Further, IEEE802.1q VLANs are also supported to make it flexible in different
application environments. Figure 2.3 shows the overall structure of the FPGA circuit.
2.2.1 Cell and Frame Wrapper
The cell and frame wrapper module is part of “Layered Protocol Wrappers”[6][5], that
are a collection of VHDL components processing high-level Internet protocols directly
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in hardware. The hardware library has four components that are used together to
transmit and receive: fixed-length cells (ATM ), variable-length AAL5 frames, IP
packets and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) frames. They are primarily designed for
the FPX, but could be also used in any hardware design. The ATM cell wrapper and
the AAL5 frame wrappers are used in the implementation of the Gigabit Ethernet
circuit design.
Incoming ATM cells from the FPX system side uses a signal Start Of Cell
(SOC ) to delimit the cells. The HEC is calculated and compared for every cell to
check the cell’s validity. If the check fails, the cell is dropped. Only valid cells are
passed to the AAL5 Frame Wrapper. The Frame Wrapper extracts the AAL5 frames
from the incoming cell stream, strips off any padding data, calculates AAL5 Frame
Checksum (FCS ) to verify the frame integrity and marks error frames. The Frame
Wrapper replaces the SOC signal with three signals, namely Start of Frame (SOF ),
End Of Frame (EOF ) and Data Enable (DataEN ). The AAL5 frame data is sent to
the Egress MAC module for processing.
An incoming AAL5 frame from the Ingress MAC module is segmented to a
series of 48-byte data chunks in order to fit them into ATM cells. The remainder is
padded with some zeros to make the size fit into one cell obeying the frame length
information provided by Ingress MAC module. The Frame Wrapper calculates the
frame FCS and then appends it as the AAL5 frame trailer. The ATM cells are passed
to Cell Wrapper from Frame Wrapper. The Cell Wrapper calculates HEC, fills it in
Header for each cell and then forwards the cells to system side.
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2.2.2 Control Cell Processor and Line Card Self-Configuration
A Control Cell Processor (CCP) block is used to receive control cells from the system
side and extract the control commands to configure both FPGA and GigE controller
ASIC. The configurations include the GigE line card’s MAC address, IP address and
mask, ARP table and initialization of the GigE ASIC. Through CCP a control host
can also read back all the statistics counters and any ARP table entry.
To enable the system to bootstrap itself, a set of initialization control cells are
stored in an on-chip Read Only Memory (ROM ). When the system boots up, the
cells are automatically injected into the CCP. Thus, the whole line card is configured
and the system can immediately operate without any outside control.
2.2.3 ARP Lookup Table and Processing
An on-chip synchronous dual port Random Access Memory (RAM ) was used to
implement the ARP lookup table. The Egress MAC module performs read operations
and Ingress MAC module performs write operations. The CCP can also access the
table for debugging purposes or manual configuration.
In order to not interrupt the system’s normal operation, the CCP has lower
priority to access the table. When the CCP issues a write or read operation, if it
happens that MAC modules are doing a similar operation, the operation from the
CCP is paused and will not be processed until the operation from MAC modules is
finished. Because two similar operation requests from the MAC modules have such
long intervals from the point of view of the system, it is safe to perform the operation
request from CCP after current operation from MAC modules. So at most 3 cycles
after issuing the read request, the CCP can get the table output. Likewise, at most
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3 cycles after issuing the write request, the data must have already been written into
the table.
Ideally, an ARP lookup table should be able to handle any number of valid
IP addresses and MAC addresses pair. But, in order to do this, an ARP lookup
engine may need to scan a very long table to find the match. That is not practical for
hardware implementation. In the implementation of the Gigabit Ethernet circuit, in
order to limit the table to a size that could fit into the available space on the FPGA, a
10-bit index is used which restricts the table size to be 1024 entries. A 2-bit network
identifier and Least Significant Byte (LSB) of the 32-bit IP address are combined to
generate the lookup index. The device supports 3 different networks with network
masks of at least 24 bits long. The network identifier is coded as 00, 01 and 10. That
allows the host identifier to be at most 8 bits long and thus allows 256 hosts to be in
one subnetwork.
The width of the data bus in the RAM is 49 bits. The lower 48-bit word is a
MAC address and the 49th bit indicates validation of the the entry. “1” indicates a
valid entry and “0” indicates an empty entry. The use of the extra bit simplifies the
logic to check the entry validation and enables the software to control the ARP table
aging.
2.2.4 Ingress MAC Processing
Figure 2.4 shows the block diagram of the Ingress MAC module. The Ingress MAC
module receives and parses the MAC frame from the GigE ASIC through a POS-
PHY Level 3 interface. The destination MAC address is checked first. If it does not
match this card’s MAC address, the whole MAC frame will be passed through the
FPX without any change. The frame is stored in a FIFO temporarily. If the frame
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Figure 2.4: Ingress MAC Processing Block Diagram
type is either an ARP request or an ARP reply, the source IP address and the MAC
address are fetched and the information is used to update the ARP lookup table. For
a matched ARP request, an ARP reply is triggered on the egress side. If the frame
has the matched destination MAC address and encapsulates an IP packet (usually
this is a control packet), the MAC header is stripped off and the pure IP packet is
stored in a FIFO temporarily. All other types of packets will be treated as unknown
types and simply discarded.
A scheduler dispatches the pass-through traffic and local traffic to the FPX
side in round-robin manner. The output IP packet or MAC frame is adapted into an
AAL5 frame in order to be fed to the Frame Wrapper module. All local IP packets
are assigned VCI 50 and all pass-through frames are assigned VCI 51. The Ingress
MAC module leaves the FCS field of the AAL5 frame blank if the packet or frame
is error free; on the contrary, if the packet or frame is marked as an errored one, a
nonzero value is filled in the AAL5 FCS field. The Frame Wrapper is responsible for
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calculating the FCS based on the packet’s correctness information. The main Finite
State Machine (FSM ) of the Ingress MAC module is shown in Figure 2.5.
2.2.5 Egress MAC Processing
As shown in Figure 2.6, the Egress MAC module receives an AAL5 frame from the
Frame Wrapper module. At first all data is buffered in a FIFO. This is because the
back pressure signal from the Egress MAC module can not stop the traffic from the
Frame Wrapper module immediately and that may cause data to be lost without
a buffer. The FIFO ’s full threshold serves as a back pressure signal to the Frame
Wrapper module. The threshold must be set to a proper value so that enough room
is left for incoming data before the Frame Wrapper module responds to this back
pressure signal.
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Once the AAL5 frame FIFO is filled with a whole frame or reaches the prede-
fined low threshold, the Egress MAC module begins reading data out of the FIFO.
In the main FSM, the AAL5 frame is classified based on the VCI value. VCI 51
means that a whole MAC frame (i.e. pass-through traffic) is encapsulated in a AAL5
frame, so the MAC frame is extracted out and scheduled to be forwarded to the
line side. VCI 50 means that the packet is a local IP packet which is generated in
the FPX. Under this condition, the FSM must obtain the destination IP address
from the AAL5 frame. The IP address might be a broadcast address with format:
{Network-Number, -1}. In this case, no ARP lookup is needed. Instead, the Egress
MAC module maps the destination MAC address to the broadcasting MAC address
FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF and forwards the IP packet. If the IP address belongs to a
multicast type (i.e. class D address: 0xE0000000 + 28 bit group ID), there is no
need to do the ARP table lookup either. The IP address is mapped to the multicast
MAC address [19] and forward the packet. In case the IP address is a unicast one,
the FSM uses the IP address to generate the index to search the ARP table. If a
valid entry is retrieved, the retrieved MAC address is used as the destination MAC
address, thus a whole MAC frame could be assembled to encapsulate the IP packet;
if the queried entry is empty or invalid, the IP packet is simply discarded and an
ARP request frame is generated and scheduled to be sent to the line side network.
With any other VCI value, the AAL5 frame is discarded and an unknown
type of frame event is reported to the CCP module. The main FSM is shown in
Figure 2.7.
After this processing, any local IP packet with a validMAC destination address
is encapsulated into a MAC frame and then is written into a FIFO. All pass-through
MAC frames are written into this FIFO too. Those triggered ARP request frames
are written into an ARP Request FIFO. The Egress MAC module also accepts the
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requests from the Ingress MAC module to generate ARP reply frames and stores
them into an ARP Reply FIFO. In a normal working environment, the ARP request
and reply happen with low frequency, so the FIFO depth is set to 4 frames each.
At last, an output scheduler FSM works in round-robin manner to detect and
dispatch data from three FIFOs alternately. If there is a whole frame in the FIFO,
the frame is read out and transmitted through a POS-PHY level 3 interface to the
GigE Controller ASIC. At this point, all the MAC frames are not padded and the
frame CRC is not calculated yet, so actually they are not complete MAC frames.
The GigE Controller ASIC is responsible for handling them by correctly configuring
the internal registers.
2.2.6 VLAN Support and Route Direction
In order to make the FPX system compatible in different application environments,
IEEE 802.1q VLANs are supported in the FPX platform. A jumper on the card
must be set before the system operation. For security reason, all local IP traffic must
use VLAN ID 1. The pass-through traffic’s VLAN ID remains unchanged.
To direct the FPX ’s routing decision upon receiving cells from the GigE line
card or system motherboard, a direction pin should be set through another jumper
on the GigE line card. The setting actually controls one bit in the VPI field of the
ATM cells which is used to decide where the cell should be forwarded: the Internet
side or the Intranet side.
2.2.7 Interface
The FPX system side interface is simple and is described in [6]. The signal SOC
indicates the first word of a cell. This word and the following 13 words belong to one
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cell. A back-pressure signal is used to control the flow rate when needed. The line
side uses a POS-PHY Level 3 standard interface to connect the ASIC PM3386 [44].
The POS-PHY Level 3 interface is a 32-bit wide interface with a clock rate of up to
104 MHz (Though we only use 62.5 MHz clock in our system). POS-PHY Level 3
was developed with the cooperation of the SATURN Development Group to cover all
applications which bit rates are up to 3.2 Gbit/s. The POS-PHY Level 3 specification
[18] defines the requirements for interoperation between devices such as the multi-
PHY PM3386 and a single Link Layer device. Each direction within the FPGA logic
contains a 4096-byte latency FIFO.
2.3 Test and Performance Evaluation
The GigE logic was synthesized using Synplify Pro and was placed and routed in
a Xilinx XC2V1000 FPGA. Table 2.1 summarizes the GigE FPGA place and route
results.
Table 2.1: Device Utilization and Timing Summary
IOBs Block RAMs SLICEs Freqency
205 31 4202
61% 77% 82% 82.2 MHz
Figure 1.1 shows an envisioned FPX system configuration. In order to debug
the system, all the four cards (2 GigE Line Cards, 1 NID-PT FPX card and 1
regular FPX card) are put into a WUGS as shown in Figure 2.8. Two hosts with
GigE interface connect two GigE cards respectively. 4 GLink cards are used for other
line connections. A TCP flow is set up between the two hosts. By this means, we
can monitor all internal interfaces by dumping the cells running through them.
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Once the system passed the test, we set up a standalone FPX system without
the WUGS as shown in Figure 2.9. In this configuration, two HP Procurve Switch
2524 [43] are used. Each switch has two GigE ports and 24 10/100M Ethernet ports.
On the Intranet side, an NCHARGE sever is running to control and configure the
FPX platform. A bunch of hosts can generate and send pass-through traffic to the
Internet side.
The host 1 ’s GigE NIC uses a 64-bit/33-MHz PCI bus and host 2 ’s GigE NIC
uses a 64-bit/66-MHz PCI bus. To test the system’s throughput, WSTTCP [34] is
used to transfer data through a TCP flow between the two hosts. Though in theory
the PCI bus can inject data at a rate of at least 2 Gigabit/second, due to the software
and operating system’s limitations, actual throughput is far below that. Figure 2.10
shows the result of one of the experiments we have done. Note that the system only
supports 1500-byte MTU.
The experiment shows that with one pair of hosts and one TCP flow, we can
get at most 800 Mbit/second throughput. In order to make the system work under a
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full gigabit rate, a bunch of hosts with 10/100M Ethernet interfaces should be used to
connect with the system through the switch. Each of them sets up a TCP connection
with the host 2 so we can easily get an aggregate gigabit throughput.
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Chapter 3
Secure Control Packet Processor
To enable secure remote control of a FPX -based firewall, a Secure Control Packet
Processor (SCPP) was designed and integrated into the FPX system. Some popular
encryption and authentication algorithms were implemented in hardware and could
be chosen from as the core components in SCPP.
3.1 Hardware implementation of Security Standard
Cores
Confidentiality is achieved by encrypting the control packets before they are sent and
decrypting them in the FPX platform. Among many block encryption algorithms,
3DES [41] and AES (Rijndael)[31] were implemented because of their efficiency and
straightforward hardware implementation.
We also need some form of acknowledgements from the platform to determine
the control packet’s status. At this point, the authentication of the message is more
critical than confidentiality. HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 were implemented for
acknowledgement packet generating.
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3.1.1 AES
The AES algorithm works by using cryptographic keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits to
encrypt 128-bit data blocks. Figure 3.1 describes the AES algorithm. In the figure, k
is the number of bits in the key, Nr is the number of iterations (or rounds) performed
to complete the encryption or decryption of a single data block. Nr is a function of
k and is 10, 12 or 14 for k of 128, 192 or 256 bits, respectively. The key schedule
expands the original key to Nr + 1 roundkeys. The operations performed in each
round are shown in the figure. Note that the last round for encryption does not
include the mix columns step, while decryption is missing the inverse mix columns in
its last round.
Although we only require AES decryption for the control packet processor,
both encryption and decryption algorithms were implemented. This will make the
module more useful in future applications. Figure 3.2 shows the block diagram of
the AES implementation. Since the key and the number of rounds are decided at
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compile time, a roundkey generator was implemented that computes the roundkeys
upon system reset. These keys are stored in the roundkey memory (block RAM ) and
read as needed. Cipher mode controls the encryption and decryption selection.
AES uses 16 256-byte substitution boxes (Sboxes) for each encryption round
and another 16 256-byte inverse Sboxes for each decryption round. If these Sboxes
were implemented using registers, each round could be completed in one clock cycle.
However, this would consume a great deal of our resources. Instead, we chose to
implement these Sboxes as block RAMs. This increased each AES round time to two
clock cycles but saved much of the chip resources for other modules. This sacrifice
can be made without much concern as it is expected that control packets will arrive
sparsely. The EPBC mode is used for data integrity purpose which requires feedback
of the previous plaintext block for decryption or ciphertext block for encryption. This
eliminates the possibility of using a loop-unrolling implementation of the encryption
algorithm. Also, due to our limited FPGA resources, a loop-unrolling implementation
makes the design impractical as it would take up most of the FPGA leaving no room
for other modules.
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3.1.2 Triple DES
DES is another widely used block encryption algorithm that uses 56-bit keys to
encrypt data in 64-bit blocks. Given the vulnerability of DES to a brute-force attack,
an alternative approach to get higher security is 3DES. 3DES uses three encryption
stages of DES chained together and a unique key for each. The basic DES algorithm
is described in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.4 shows the 3DES encryption and decryption
structures. A free DES core written in VHDL was found on the web and used to
implement our 3DES [15]. It contains both iterative and loop-unrolling versions of
the algorithm. Again we chose to use the iterative version for the same reasons
discussed in the AES section.
3.1.3 MD5 and SHA-1
MD5 and SHA-1 are message digest algorithms specified for use in Internet Protocol
Security (IPSec). Both algorithms take as input a message of arbitrary length and
produce as output a message digest of 128 bits for MD5 and of 160 bits for SHA-
1. The input message is first padded and appended with message length to be a
multiple of 512 bits. Then the message is processed in 512-bit blocks with an n-bit
initial value, where n is 128 for MD5 and 160 for SHA-1. Further details regarding
MD5 and SHA-1 can be found in reference [36] and [13], respectively. The MD5 and
SHA-1 cores were implemented using iterative architecture and have a latency of 197
34
Y0 Y1 YqYp
512 bit 512 bit 512 bit 512 bit
n−bit digest
CV1
IV
CVqCVp
MD5/SHA−1 MD5/SHA−1 MD5/SHA−1 MD5/SHA−1
n n n n
512 512 512 512
message lengthpaddingmessage
Figure 3.5: MD5 and SHA-1 Algorithm Architecture
and 245 clock cycles respectively to hash a 512-bit data block. These numbers are
higher than other implementations of the same algorithms [12]. This is because the
four 32-bit additions required by each step of the hashing algorithms were spread out
over three clock cycles to increase clock speed. As mentioned earlier, control packets
arrive sparsely so latency is not a high concern. The hardware architecture of MD5
and SHA-1 is shown in Figure 3.5.
3.1.4 HMAC
HMAC is used in conjunction with either MD5 or SHA-1. It uses a secret key to
validate the information being sent from the SCPP back to the administrating host.
HMAC can be further described by the following equation:
HMACtext = H(K ⊕ opad,H(K ⊕ ipad, text))
where K is a secret key (we use a 512-bit key), ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64
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times, opad is the byte 0x5C repeated 64 times, H is hashing function (MD5 or SHA-
1 ). The result is a 128-bit digest for MD5 and a 160-bit digest for SHA-1. Figure 3.6
shows the hardware implementation of HMAC.
We implemented HMAC more efficiently by precomputing H(K ⊕ opad) and
H(K ⊕ ipad) [41]. Because the padded message can fit into one block, this technique
doubles the throughput of the circuit by eliminating two of the four hashes that need
to be computed for each packet.
3.1.5 EPBC mode
To validate the integrity of control packets after they have been decrypted, AES and
3DES were implemented in Error-Propagating Block Chaining (EPBC ) mode. We
use this mode instead of HMAC here because it is nearly free in regard to circuit
overhead compared to the hash function. EPBC mode allows us to validate the
integrity of the decrypted data by comparing the decrypted value of the last block to
the predefined integrity value. If they are the same, it is reasonable to believe that
36
Encrypt( ) Encrypt( )
g( ) g( )
Fi−1
Pi
Gi−1
Gi
Fi
Ci Ci+1
Fi+1
Gi+1
Pi+1 Ci
Pi Pi+1
Ci+1
Decrypt( ) Decrypt( )
g( ) g( )
Fi−1
Gi−1
Gi
Fi Fi+1
Gi+1
(a) EPBC Encryption (b) EPBC Decryption
Figure 3.7: EPBC Mode Block Diagram
the control packet has not been tampered with. Otherwise the control packet should
be discarded.
As shown in Figure 3.7, EPBC mode can be further described by the following
equations where the initial values of F and G are two distinct initial vectors (IVs).
The size of the IVs is the same as the block size for each algorithm (128 bits for AES
and 64 bits for 3DES ). P and C represent the plaintext and ciphertext, respectively.
The block number is denoted by i. And finally, E and D represent the encrypt and
decrypt functions, respectively.
Encryption: Decryption:
Gi = Pi ⊕ Fi−1 Fi = Ci ⊕ g(Gi−1)
Fi = Ekey(Gi) Gi = Dkey(Fi)
Ci = Fi ⊕ g(Gi−1) Pi = Gi ⊕ Fi−1
In the above equations, function g() operates as follows:
g(G) = 〈GH +GL, GH ·GL〉
Where G ≡ 〈GH , GL〉, GH and GL are the high and low order halves of G
respectively.
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3.2 Secure Configuration and Acknowledgement
3.2.1 Configuration Console
A simple protocol was designed to ensure the reliable FPX control and configuration.
The control packet is encrypted in the administrating host. For each received control
packet, the FPX platform sends back a keyed authenticated acknowledgement packet
to report the control packet’s status (accepted or dropped). In the following cases,
administrating host needs to resend the control packet:
• Timeout;
• Unrecognized acknowledgement packet;
• Acknowledgement packet reports the control packet is dropped.
If administrating host can’t correctly configure the FPX platform for several itera-
tions, it might indicate network failure or imply some attack is happening.
3.2.2 Encrypted Control Packet Format
The same control packet format is applied for both 3DES and AES encryptions for
uniform processing. The control packet uses 128-bit IVs since AES requires this. In
the 3DES application, only the first 64 bits of each IV are used for decryption and
the remaining 64 bits are ignored. We need to pad the control packet body to make it
a multiple of the block size. The padding for the control packet is dependent on the
encryption algorithm chosen. The last data block in the control packet is an integrity
check. This block uses a predefined value that is checked in the hardware when the
packet has been completely decrypted. The layout of the control packet is shown in
Figure 3.8a.
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3.2.3 Authentication Packet Format
In order to determine if a control packet that was sent to the FPX platform was
actually accepted, the FPX platform should return an acknowledgement packet. This
packet contains a hash of the IVs concatenated with the 16-bit destination port and
a 16-bit status value. Since all IVs are randomly generated, each acknowledgement
packet can be identified through its IVs without providing extra information. The
layout of the authentication packet is shown in Figure 3.8b.
3.3 Infrastructure
Simply implementing the encryption and hashing algorithms is not nearly enough
to provide security features for the FPX platform. Logic was required to identify
control packets and pass these packets through SCPP while all other packets pass
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through unmodified. Figure 3.9 illustrates the logic components in the secure control
processor. A description of the major components’ functionality follows.
Control Packet Filter
This block receives the data from the protocol wrappers and filters out the control
packets based on the FPX platform’s IP address and the UDP port number. These
control packets are sent to the control packet splitter. Non-control packets are buffered
in the normal packet buffer and scheduled to be forwarded to the downstream modules
of the FPX platform.
Control Packet Splitter
This block further processes the control packets. It extracts the IP addresses, UDP
ports and two IVs from the packet and buffers them to be used in the following
blocks. Finally, it assembles the encrypted 32-bit words of the packet body into the
larger data block necessary for each algorithm (64 bits for 3DES and 128 bits for
AES ). These data blocks are buffered up to be sent to the decryption core.
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Control Packet Body and Information Buffer
Due to the decryption latency, FIFOs are needed to buffer the data and all necessary
information for decrypting, reassembling the control packet and creating authenti-
cated acknowledgement packets.
Decryption Core
The decryption core instantiates either the AES or 3DES core in EPBC mode. When
the core is not busy, it dequeues a data block from the control packet body buffer for
decryption. Once a block has been decrypted it is forward to the integrity checker.
Integrity Checker
The integrity checker is basically a 128-bit comparator. It compares the decrypted
value of the last 128-bits of control packets against a predefined integrity check. If
any of the cipher blocks was modified prior to decryption, this “error” will propagate
to the last decrypted block and it will fail the integrity check. Exact matching means
that the packet is the same as the original control packet so it is considered valid.
Only valid control packets are forwarded to the downstream modules in the FPX
platform. Invalid control packets are dropped.
Control Packet Recovery
When a decrypted control packet has successfully passed the integrity check, the
recovery component rebuilds the control packet from the decrypted payload using the
information previously stored in the control packet info buffer.
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Authentication Core
The authentication core instantiates either HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1. For each
incoming control packet an authentication digest is computed. The message to be
hashed consists of the two IVs for the control packet, the destination port, and a
16-bit field indicating the packet status. Once computed, the digest is forwarded to
the acknowledgement packet generator.
Acknowledgement Packet Generator
For each incoming control packet, an acknowledgement packet is generated. The
destination of this packet is simply the source of the corresponding control packet.
This information is retrieved from the control packet info buffer. A UDP packet
is then generated using the hash digest as the payload. Once an acknowledgement
packet has been generated, the packet generator requests the output bus from the
output scheduler.
Normal Packet Buffer
As decrypting control packets is a time consuming process, all other traffic is for-
warded around the decryption engine. This buffer receives all normal traffic from
the control packet filter. Whenever there is an outstanding packet in this buffer it
requests the output bus from the output scheduler.
Output Scheduler
This block schedules the output packets in a basic round robin scheme. It services
the control packet recovery, the acknowledgement packet generator and the normal
packet buffer.
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3.4 Results and Analysis
The architecture described has been synthesized using Synplify Pro and the Xilinx
backend place and route tools to implement the design on a Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-
6 FPGA. Table 3.1 summarizes the results for the encryption cores, and Table 3.2
summarizes the results for the two authentication cores. The Rate column represents
the throughput of control packets and acknowledgement packets through the SCPP.
From these results we can see that the 3DES core is much more efficient with
regards to resource usage. However, throughput of the AES core is several times
higher than 3DES. This is primarily due to two factors. The first is the fact that
AES decrypts 128-bit blocks at a time, whereas 3DES only decrypts 64-bit blocks.
Secondly, 3DES uses many more rounds than AES. With this in mind, it is clear that
it would be more beneficial to chose 3DES when space is a major concern. Otherwise,
if throughput is a major concern, AES would be more suitable.
Table 3.3 shows the overall system performance of the FPX platform which
implements a hardware based firewall with different algorithm combinations. AES-
128-HMAC-SHA1 gives the highest throughput.
Table 3.1: Synthesis Results: Encryption Cores
LUTs Block RAM Timing Rate
# % # % MHz Mbps
3DES 1223 3% 0 0% 55.2 98
AES-128 2503 5.8% 44 27% 85.6 547.8
AES-192 2610 6.0% 44 27% 86.7 462.4
AES-256 2677 6.2% 44 27% 92 420.6
Table 3.2: Synthesis Results: HMAC Modes
LUTs Block RAM Timing Rate
mode # % # % MHz Mbps
MD5 5284 13% 0 0% 58.5 152
SHA-1 5796 15% 0 0% 56.5 118
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Table 3.3: Placed and Routed Firewall Design
Slices Block RAM Timing Rate
3DES-HMAC
config. # % # % MHz Mbps
MD5 13239 68% 83 51% 49.2 1574
SHA1 13698 71% 83 51% 50.5 1616
AES-128-HMAC
MD5 13543 70% 123 76% 45.8 1466
SHA1 14331 74% 123 76% 60.3 1930
AES-192-HMAC
MD5 13775 71% 123 76% 48.8 1560
SHA1 14102 73% 123 76% 56.6 1811
AES-256-HMAC
MD5 13698 71% 123 76% 50.6 1620
SHA1 14221 74% 123 76% 54.9 1758
We also compared the hardware implementations’ performance with the soft-
ware benchmarks found in [11]. The benchmark results are based on the C++ code
running on an 850 MHz Celeron processor. From Figure 3.10, we find that the per-
formance of 3DES and AES is much better than the performance of the software
implementation. For hash functions, software implementation is much faster than its
hardware equivalent. It makes sense because hash algorithms were designed mainly
for software implementation while most of the symmetric encryption algorithms were
optimized for hardware implementation.
3.4.1 Software Implementation
While 3DES, EPBC mode and HMAC were original code, AES, MD5 and SHA1
implementations were obtained via the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST )[29].
On each execution, the program randomly generates IVs to be used for en-
crypting the control packet. The original payload is read from a file, encrypted, and
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Figure 3.10: Hardware/Software Performance Comparison
appended to the IVs along with the integrity check to make up the encrypted payload
for the control packet. At the same time, the selected HMAC algorithm is run on the
IVs to create digests for comparison to feedback packets. A digest is created for a
feedback packet signifying a successful configuration as well as one signifying a failed
configuration (i.e. a dropped control packet).
3.4.2 Testing
Testing of SCPP was performed in a live network using the FPX platform (Fig-
ure 3.11) in a WUGS. A modified version of the NCHARGE [40] web interface was
used to read our encrypted payloads and create the necessary packet and cell headers.
The interface supplies a selection box for choosing both the encryption and the au-
thentication algorithm. It also provides fields for other packet information including
IP address, port number and non-encrypted payload data. Once the information for
our test packet is entered, the web interface calls a CGI script to interpret the infor-
mation, run it through the encryption software and send the packet to the hardware
via a Gigabit Link connector between the PC andWUGS. NCHARGE then attempts
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Figure 3.11: FPX Test Platform
to read any acknowledgement packets from the line. Any acknowledgement packet
received is displayed and compared to the pre-computed digests. This comparison
determines if the control packet was accepted by the FPX or not. If not, the control
packet would need to be retransmitted until a successful configuration occurred.
AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, and 3DES with both HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
SHA1 (for a total of eight different core modes) were all tested. Each core passed the
tests by successfully configuring the FPX platform and returning expected acknowl-
edgement packets. We also simulated different attacks to the FPX platform, such
as fake control packets, message modification and denial of service. All attacks were
detected by the FPX platform or the administrating host successfully.
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Chapter 4
Secure Remote Control Protocol
4.1 Architecture
Some drawbacks exist in the SCPP structure. First, it is subject to a replay attack.
That means an attacker can capture a control packet and send it to the target again
at any time. The FPX cannot identify if it is a replay packet. Second, the communi-
cation protocol is stop-and-wait. It is too slow if we want to download a large bitfile
to the FPX platform. In order to overcome these drawbacks, an improved protocol
is presented. It can also be used in any environment in which we need to control a
hardware based reconfigurable network node through the public Internet.
The secure configuration architecture provides the infrastructure for secure
communications between the control console and Reconfigurable Hardware Nodes
(RHN ) over the Internet. Communications are conducted through encrypted and
authenticated control packets. A functional module called the Secure Control Man-
ager (SCM ) performs all security related tasks, ensuring that only authorized access
to the RHN is allowed. Figure 4.1 shows the security configuration architecture.
A unique aspect of this architecture is that SCM is implemented in pure hardware.
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Avoiding software involvement in network processing is important because it prevents
the nodes from being hacked using traditional vulnerabilities found in operating sys-
tems. SCM implements some encryption and authentication algorithms to guarantee
data confidentiality and integrity. It is also responsible for establishment, mainte-
nance and termination of the secure connection.
4.2 Protocol
A security protocol is needed to secure the communications between the control con-
sole and RHNs. The goal of this protocol is to provide a secure communication chan-
nel, so that attackers will not be able to damage or steal information from the RHNs.
Even if the node is under attack or experiencing network failure, the protocol can let
the control console be aware of the attack and take actions. The protocol includes
a flow control and an error control scheme. It relies on positive acknowledgement
and retransmission when the control console does not receive an acknowledgement
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within a given timeout period. The protocol need to be implemented not only on
the administration host in software, but also on the SCM in pure hardware which is
hard to accommodate a complicated protocol. Fortunately, in most cases, the control
console and the RHN act as master and slave. Control console is always take the
initiative to establishment and termination of connections. This feature enables us
to design a simple yet efficient protocol based on Go-back-N ARQ to support only
end-to-end communication, with which at the same time configuration packets are
issued only from one control console.
A sliding window mechanism is used to provide flow control. Similar to the
mechanism in HDLC, an acknowledgement (ACK ) of new incoming packets automat-
ically moves the sliding window to grant permission to more packets. In our system,
the size of the sliding window is decided mainly by the buffer size in the SCM. Error
control is done by exerting encryption and authentication on each control packet.
Retransmission of a packet is necessitated when a packet never arrives at the recon-
figurable hardware node or an arriving packet is discarded by the RHN because of
errors. Here we implement a batch retransmission strategy, particularly because of
the requirement that the packets configure or reprogram the hardware nodes in an
in-order fashion. It works by maintaining one retransmission timer for the entire
sliding window. If no ACK is received before the timer expires, the control con-
sole must retransmit from the first packet and reset the timer; otherwise, the sliding
window is adjusted and the timer is reset. A sequence number indicating the order
of control packet is encrypted in the packet body. For each establishment of a new
connection, a random sequence number is generated in the RHN and sent back to
the control console. The sequence number is incremented during the maintenance of
the connection.
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Handling connection termination can be complicated in some protocols. How-
ever since only end-to-end communication is supported and the SCM does not pre-
serve any information for the current connection except for the sequence number, the
termination of the current connection is only meaningful for the control console. In
this protocol, connection termination to the RHN is simply establishment of a new
connection. As to the control console, an initiative termination is stopping sending
new control packet after the ACK of the last control packet; and a passive termina-
tion is unsuccessful communication with a timeout period. In the second case, the
control console will be aware of either the network failure or potential attacks to the
system.
During the above discussion, we assume that before each connection the control
console and the RHN shares a secret key, which is used to protect all transferred data.
Security key management is extremely difficult for pure hardware implementation.
Therefore, in our current protocol, we assume the secret key is hardcoded in the
RHN and shared with each control console.
This protocol is strong enough to protect the configurable hardware nodes from
the common attacks, which we talked about in the section one. First, eavesdropping
and fake packet attacks are avoided by applying encryption and authentication to
the control packets. Second, replay attack is prevented by using encrypted sequence
number. By randomly generating sequence number SN from the control console side,
even if malicious users capture all the packets sending from the host, re-sending them
to the RHN will not be accepted due to the discontinuity of the sequence number.
The administration host has a time-out mechanism, therefore, when RHN is under
attack or network fails, the host can be aware of these problems and take action.
The communication between the administration host and the RHN is through
UDP packets. We call it control packet. For uniform processing, all control packets
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have the same format. Control packets include session establishment packet, config-
uration packet, status inquiry packet, and acknowledgement packet. The destination
IP address and UDP port number are used to identify the individual configurable
module inside the RHN.
The first 4 32-bit words in the UDP payload is IVs required by EPBC mode.
The next word is 32-bit SN for flow control. The first byte of the following word
denote a unique Control Packet Code (CPC ) for each type of the control packet.
The administration host and the RHN can distinguish and process the packet by its
CPC. All RHN control or configuration information follows. Control packet payload
is padded to be multiple of the block size. The last 128-bit data block in the control
packet is integrity check. This block uses a predefined value that is checked in the
hardware when the packet has been completely decrypted. The layout of the control
packet can be seen in Figure 4.2.
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Communication is divided into two phases: the session establishment phase
and configuration phase. To establish a communication session, the host sends a
control packet with CPC equal to 0 during session establishment phase. Once the
RHN receives and accepts the connection requirement, an acknowledgement control
packet is sent back with CPC equal to 0. A randomly generated SN telling the
administration host to start sending packets from the appointed SN is also encrypted
in the acknowledgement packet body. If the administration host doesn’t receive the
ACK within a timeout period, it sends the initialization control packet again. If this
fails after a predefined number of times, the administration host will know that it
is experiencing network failure or attacks. If the administration host gets the ACK
successfully, the communication goes into the configuration phase.
The administration host sends configuration packet (CPC = 1) or status re-
quest packet (CPC = 2) with successive SN within the bound of the current sliding
window. The RHN receives a error-free packet, it sends back an ACK (CPC = 1) to
tell the host the next expected SN N’. The effect of this ACK actually acknowledges
all packets with SN prior to this one N’. If the SN of this error-free packet matches
the expected SN, RHN will forward this packet to the rest of the RHN modules.
If due to any error the RHN can not accept the current control packet, it silently
discard the packet and whatever the following control packets till an acceptable one
with the expected SN. If the host experiences a timeout without receiving any ACK,
it will resend all the packets in the current window. On condition that RHN ac-
cepts a status inquiry packet, it sends back an ACK with the inquired information
assembled in the packet body and CPC set to 2. This indicates it is not only an
acknowledgement, but also a reply to an inquiry.
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4.3 Application in FPX system
Considering the reality of the FPX system, we decided to apply the encryption in the
NID-PT card and leave the data integrity and sequence number control logic to be
processed in the regular FPX card. AES is exerted only to the control cell payload.
Firstly, this arrangement conforms to the principle of layered protocol. Mapped into
the seven layer network model, encryption functions could be in physical layer while
data integrity and authentication check functions could be in link layer. Secondly,
current FPX system and related software are all well defined and work well. The
control cell’s format inherited the data integrity check by AAL0 CRC and sequence
number control by SN field. What’s more, the length of the cell payload is 48 bytes,
that are exactly 3 128-bit blocks for AES cipher. There is no important information
that needs to hide in cell header so we don’t need to encrypt it at all. All these
considerations simplified the modifications and new designs that need to be added to
the FPX system. The logic view of the NID-PT FPX card is shown in Figure 4.3
The NID FPGA on the NID-PT card has consumed more than 75% of the
resource. The encryption and decryption module have to be placed in the RAD
FPGA. Only control cells need to be routed to the RAD. Two modules shown in
Figure 4.4 are used in RAD to process bidirectional control cells.
The incoming cell is splitted into two parts: the header and the payload. The
cell header is stored in a FIFO and the cell payload is transformed to 3 128-bit data
blocks to be buffered in another FIFO. An AES core retrieves the data block from
the payload buffer to encrypt or decrypted it. After each 3 consecutive data blocks
are processed, one cell header is read out from the header buffer and a whole ATM
cell is reassembled and sent back to NID-PT. A back pressure signal is used to control
the flow rate.
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By restricting the key size to 128 bits, AES core need at least 11 clock cycles
to process one 128-bit data block. The system will work under 62.5 MHz frequency,
so roughly we can get the control cell throughput up to 727 Mbps.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Remarks
The FPX platform can be applied in many network processing systems such as fire-
walls, packet classifiers, content scanners and copyright protection units.
A GigE Card FPGA was designed to provide a line interface for the FPX
platform. The FPGA implements ARP and transforms packets between ATM and
Gigabit Ethernet. The card is fully tested and can support 1 Gbit/sec throughput.
The GigE card FPGA implements ARP, but it is not fully compliant with
the standard in that the ARP table does not support entry aging. That feature is
expensive to implement in hardware. We can implement it in software by periodically
polling the table entries. However, in the current FPX platform applications, this is
not a critical requirement.
For historical reason, the basic unit processed in FPX is an ATM cell. It is
not necessary in some of the FPX applications and it does introduce extra overhead.
The evolving system will get rid of this step by step.
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We also made efforts to solve the security problem when configuring the FPX
platform through the public Internet. A suite of security algorithms were implemented
in hardware and they were applied in SCPP to provide baseline protection to the
control and configuration channel of the FPX platform.
Though the SCPP architecture provides strong protection to the FPX plat-
form configuration channel, it is cumbersome and not very efficiency. The main
achievement is we implemented a suite of hardware cores and verified them in real
applications. They are the base blocks to build the future hardware based network
security applications. Another problem is the SCCP can lack of defense against the
replay attacks, so we proposed a more robust and more general protocol which in-
tends to secure the control and configuration channel between central console and
the hardware based network nodes. A practical module was designed to support this
protocol in the FPX platform.
5.2 Future Work
As the network bandwidth continues growing explosively, the FPX platform may be
applied in different and higher bandwidth environments, such as SONET OC-192 and
10 Gigabit Ethernet. More types of Network Interface Card (NIC ) will be required.
Still, logic are needed to provide the bridge between the line side and the system
side. For robust application and fault tolerance, the system should support Automat-
ical Protection Switch (APS ). A backup FPX platform can provide protection when
network failure occurs without interrupting the whole system.
For secure control and configuration, if we consider the scalability issue, it
is actually a secure and reliable multicast problem. There already exist a lot of
protocols and algorithms that try to solve this problem but no one is widely accepted
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and deployed. This is still an open area for future research. The multicast model is
source-specified, the problems include many aspects such as source authentication,
access control, key distribution and network topology. The main constraint in our
system is the limited hardware resource.
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